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Five steps towards a more effective global drug policy 
Introduction 
We are at an interesting global juncture for drug policy, with an increasing volume of 
literature critiquing a zero tolerance approach, arguing that it has made little impression on 
either the production or consumption of illegal substances, and has caused a number of 
serious unintended consequences for both drug users and the societies in which they live.  
At the same time, increasingly liberal systems of drug policy have emerged.  Portugal, for 
example, decriminalised the possession of all drugs for personal use in 2001.  More recently, 
in the United States, Colorado and Washington have already established fully regulated 
cannabis markets.  Alaska, Oregon and Washington DC have emerging regulated markets; 
and others such as Nevada, California, Arizona and Maine are widely expected to propose 
similar systems by 2016.  Similarly, in Uruguay, legislation has been approved which will 
provide the first nationwide regulated cannabis market, and the pressure for international 
treaty reform from Latin American governments in general is growing. Nevertheless, Reuter 
(2011) has noted the difficulties that any government has in breaking out of the traditional 
drug policy mould.  Any significant change requires the employment of sometimes radical 
new solutions which, if not found to be successful, would amount to political suicide for 
those involved in having pushed through their implementation.  Thus, global drug policy 
often appears to be in a position of stalemate  W the evidence of failure mounts, but the 
appetite for alternatives remains muted.  This chapter offers five steps that we need to take 
if we are to effect any substantial change in drug policy on a global scale, and produce 
policies that are both more effective and more humane.    
 
1. Acknowledge the failure of a war on drugs strategy, and the unintended consequences it 
has produced. 
 
Until the early 1900s, few countries in the world had any form of national drug legislation: the use of 
specific substances - such as cocaine or opium - was not likely to be considered either unduly 
harmful to the individual, or worthy of the intervention of national or international governments.  
This, however, was to radically change from the date of the first international opium convention, 
held in Shanghai in 1909 at the behest of the Americans, which saw the birth of an international 
approach to drug policy, as well as the emergence of prohibition style policy as the accepted way to 
deal with drug problems (Bruun et al., 1975).  The 1909 Shanghai Convention was to become the 
first in an increasingly influential series of international agreements on the topic of drugs, the most 
important of which is the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.  The 1961 convention commits 
ĂůůƐŝŐŶĂƚŽƌŝĞƐƚŽƚŚĞƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ “ĂĚĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƚŽŶĂƌĐŽƚŝĐĚƌƵŐƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐĂƐĞƌŝŽƵƐĞǀŝůĨŽƌƚŚĞ
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĂŶĚŝƐĨƌĂƵŐŚƚǁŝƚŚƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĚĂŶŐĞƌ ? (United Nations, 1961: 1).  On these 
grounds, the manufacture, import, export and possession of substances such as cannabis, cocaine 
and opium, must be prohibited, and is usually criminalised.  Ultimately, the policy of prohibition aims 
ƚŽĚĞůŝǀĞƌĂ ‘ĚƌƵŐĨƌĞĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶg under the assumption ƚŚĂƚ “ĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĚĞƚĞƌƐĚƌƵŐƵƐĞ ?
and therefore reduces harm tŽŚĞĂůƚŚ ? ?DĞŶĂ ?,ŽďďƐ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ?).   
 
 
The policy of prohibition enshrined in the international conventions has, since the outset, been 
championed most heavily and most consistently by America.  In 1971 President Richard Nixon 
ĞƐĐĂůĂƚĞĚƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨŵĞƌŝĐĂŶŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĚƌƵŐƉŽůŝĐǇƚŽƚŚĂƚŽĨĂ ‘ǁĂƌŽŶĚƌƵŐƐ ?.  Drugs were 
designated as the number one public enemy, a state of national emergency was declared, and 
mandatory sentences and a huge increase in federal funds were implemented (Woodiwiss, 1998). 
This initial declaration of war was intensified, first by Ronald Reagan who declared drugs (inspired by 
the crack cocaine epidemic) a national security threat, and then by George Bush senior who shifted 
the focus to countries that supply drugs and channelled American efforts into curbing drug 
production (Bullington, 2000).  These successive strategies have drawn much of the rest of the world 
ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ǁĂƌŽŶĚƌƵŐƐ ?ĂŶĚĞŶƐƵred that the stringently prohibitionist aim of a drug free world has 
been the continued focus of global drug policy.   
 
 
More recently, general recognition of the failure of the war on drugs strategy has grown in certain 
circles.  In the first instance, the available evidence suggests that the number of drug users, rather 
than being eradicated or significantly reduced, has grown significantly since the 1960s, and now 
remains at a consistently high rate (EMCDDA, 2015; UNODC, 2014).  Alongside this, global data 
reports that drugs have become increasingly easy to obtain over the years and prices have generally 
decreased (EMCDDA, 2015; UNODC, 2014).  The lofty aims of a drug free world, or a significant 
reduction in the use and supply of drugs, have therefore come to seem a distant possibility, in favour 
of the emergence of a multi-billion dollar market for illegal substances which remains in the 
hands of criminals.  This fĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽŵĂŬĞŚĞĂĚǁĂǇŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ǁĂƌŽŶĚƌƵŐƐ ? has been accompanied by a 
growing awareness of the unintended and harmful consequences that it can bring.  Kebhaj et al. 
(2013) report on significant increases in the number of people being arrested and incarcerated for 
drug offences which leads to an overall increase in the number of people, particularly young people, 
being criminalised, and clogs up the courts and the prisons.  The link between contact with the 
criminal justice system and race is now well documented (Alexander, 2010; Provine, 2007) resulting 
in disproportionate numbers of black men being sanctioned for these offences.  An overriding 
emphasis on prohibition has ensured that funding goes to law enforcement efforts rather than 
treatment, and means that the users of drugs themselves have become a group who are 
 “criminalised, marginalised and stigmatised ? (Global Commission on Drug Policy, 2011: 9), and who 
remain at significant risk of drug related disease and/or death.  These problems can be seen most 
starkly in America where prohibition has been most stringently interpreted, but can also be seen to a 
greater or lesser extent in most other nations characterised as net consumers of drugs. 
 
 
There are even more devastating consequences for countries which are characterised as the 
traditional producers of drugs.  Bush senior conceptualised the drugs issue as a problem that was 
external to America  W ŝĨŽƚŚĞƌĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐǁĞƌĞŶ ?ƚƉƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐĂŶĚŵĂƌŬĞƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ ?ƚŚĞŶ
ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚďĞůƵƌĞĚŝŶƚŽďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚŽŶƚŚĞŵ ?dŚŝƐŝs a line of 
argument that has been generally adopted wholesale throughout the Western world in relation to 
producer countries, and has resulted in the implementation of extremely harmful policies.  These 
harms include the corruption of governments in countries where organised criminals are more well 
resourced than the governments themselves, rising levels of drug use, significantly increased levels 
of violence, armed violence and homicide, environmental problems caused by, for example, 
aggressive crop spraying programmes, and human rights abuses such as the routine shooting of child 
cannabis farmers in Iran (Amnesty International, 2012; Bowling, 2011; Mena & Hobbs, 2010).  In 
spite of these efforts, Youngers & Roisin (2005) report that, globally, levels of coca production have 
remained steady.   Many (Bowling, 2010; Costa, 2008) have attributed this to the phenomenon of 
displacement whereby efforts concentrated against drug production in a particular geographical 
location can be effective in the short term, but ultimately lead to a displacement in activity to a 
different geographical location, which then also experiences the problems brought by illegal drug 
production.  Bowling (2011), inspired by the work of Jock Young in 1971 on drug control and 
deviancy amplification, has conceptualised the situation described above as an example of iatrogenic 
harm whereby the drug problems have worsened, not in spite of prohibition policies, but, in some 
cases, because of them: in other words, the countries which have implemented these policies have 
themselves become the producers of harm.   
 
There is increasing evidence of disillusionment with Ă ‘ǁĂƌŽŶĚƌƵŐƐ ? policy: president Obama 
publically abandoned the term in 2005, regulated cannabis markets are being trialled in some US 
states and Uruguay, there are increasing calls for reform of the UN international drug conventions, 
and the heads of some drug producing countries are beginning to speak out about the role of 
consumer countries in contributing to the problem.  There is also, however, much to suggest that a 
stringent interpretation of prohibition continues to persist.  For example,  a United Nations General 
Assembly special session on drugs in 1998 recommitted to the goal of a drug free world by 2008 and, 
when this date was reached without success, only modified the aim to a world in which the use and 
supply of drugs was significantly reduced. Similarly, successive European Union drug strategies and 
action plans have consistently maintained their primary aims as the significant reduction of drug use 
and drug supply.  Finally, the global reaction to the recent emergence of New Psychoactive 
^ƵďƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?EW^ ?ŚĂƐĂůŵŽƐƚƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůůǇďĞĞŶƚŽŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚ ‘ǁĂƌŽŶĚƌƵŐƐ ?ƐƚǇůĞĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇ
legislation and, in Poland, Ireland and the UK, to introduce blanket bans, in what Stevens and 
Measham (2014 ?ŚĂǀĞƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐĂ ‘ĚƌƵŐƉŽůŝĐǇƌĂƚĐŚĞƚ ? ? 
 
 
While we continue to cling to these extreme versions of prohibition that prioritise law enforcement 
efforts over all other types of intervention, we cannot see real progress in global drug policy.  In 
order to improve the way that we control the use of illicit substances, the first step ought, therefore, 
to be to accept the global ĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ǁĂƌŽŶĚƌƵŐƐ ?ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ, and to acknowledge the many harms 
that it has produced.  Such an acknowledgement does not mean the end of prohibition  W reducing 
the demand for and supply of illicit substances is still a worthy goal.  There are, however, many ways 
of implementing prohibition based policies that do not make enemies out of the users, suppliers and 
producers of illegal substances, and which rather seek to achieve these goals without  producing 





 2. Recognise the importance of reducing drug related harm, of upholding human rights, and of 
giving public health a more prominent role in the formulation of policy.   
 
The problems with a war on drugs strategy and an exclusive focus on law enforcement have been 
outlined above.  As we have seen, waging war on the supply of drugs can do much to damage 
vulnerable people in producer countries, and waging war on the demand for drugs can criminalise, 
stigmatise and marginalise the users of drugs.  It is not enough, however, to abandon these 
strategies: we need to develop alternatives for controlling illicit substances, that can be employed 
alongside, or in place of, law enforcement strategies. These alternative strategies should aim to 
reduce or minimise the harm done to the users and producers of drugs, to promote and protect 
public health, and to uphold the human rights of those who use drugs.    
 
,ĂƌŵƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŝƐďƌŽĂĚďƌƵƐŚƚĞƌŵŝŶŽůŽŐǇǁŚŝĐŚĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐ “ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐĂŶĚƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ
that seek to reduce the health, social and economic harms of drug use to individuals, communities 
ĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĞƚŝĞƐ ? (Rhodes & Hedrich, 2010: 21).  The over-arching aim of a utopian (de Jarlais, 1995) 
 ‘ĚƌƵŐĨƌĞĞƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ŝƐ replaced by an acceptance that illicit drug use is part of our world, and a 
primary goal of reducing the harm done by the use of drugs (Lenton & Single, 1998).  These may be 
the primary harms caused by the use of drugs themselves, or, more usually, the secondary harms 
that are done to the users and suppliers of drugs because of the policies that have been put in place 
to control the criminalised substances.  For example, one of the strategies to control the use of 
injecting heroin has been to limit access to the needles which are used to inject the drug.  This 
strategy, however, has caused considerable harm in that users of heroin have often, due to their 
scarcity, shared needles, opening themselves up to increased rates of infection from serious diseases 
such as HIV, AIDS and Hepatitis C.  Hawks & Lenton (1998) suggest that most drug policy initiatives 
have been implemented without due consideration of the harms or unintended consequences that 
they may cause, and harm reduction can thus be conceptualised as an attempt to remedy that by 
retrospectively revisiting drug policy initiatives in order to reduce those harms that have been 
caused. 
 
Harm reduction is by no means a new concept within the drugs field: in the 1920s, addicts in the UK 
were prescribed heroin and/or morphine (Spear, 1994), in the 1960s methadone maintenance 
treatment was introduced in the United States (Eriksson, 1999), and in the early 1980s groups of 
ƵƚĐŚĚƌƵŐƵƐĞƌƐĐĂŵĞƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌƚŽĨŽƌŵƚŚĞ ‘:ƵŶŬŝĞďŽŶĚ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƐŽĨĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ
drug users (Chatwin, 2010a) to both needle exchange services and substitution treatment.  In 
particular, throughout the 1980s, the value of harm reduction strategies was highlighted in response 
to the threat of AIDS (Hunt, 2004).  Due, in part, to the sharing of needles and the unsanitary 
injecting practices of many heroin addicts, levels of HIV and AIDS infection were relatively high 
amongst the dependent drug using population.  At this time, many dependent drug users also 
worked as prostitutes to fund their drug habit, and thus the infection rate was at risk of spreading to 
the general population.  Services which provided addicts with clean needles and services which, in 
ƐŽŵĞĐĂƐĞƐ ?ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇƐƵƉƉůŝĞĚĚƌƵŐƵƐĞƌƐǁŝƚŚ ‘ƐĂĨĞƌ ?ǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĚƌƵŐƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐŵĞƚŚĂĚŽŶĞ 
maintenance programmes) were therefore authorised on a fairly widespread scale, in an effort to 
reduce or minimise the harm done by the criminalisation of drugs. 
 
In these early beginnings, providing drug addicts with needles to inject their drugs, or giving them 
access to versions of the drugs themselves through substitution treatment, were seen as rather 
controversial and in direct contradiction to the main aim of global drug policy: prohibiting the use 
and supply of drugs.  Now, however, needle exchange programmes and substitution treatment are 
relatively standard provisions in consumer countries throughout the Western world.  In order to 
become a member state of the European Union, for example, it is now necessary to show that you 
have implemented both of these harm reduction strategies (Rhodes & Hedrich, 2010).  New harm 
reduction approaches have since developed, such as street level nursing (showing injecting drug 
users the safest ways to inject), the provision of drug consumption rooms (safe places to use drugs), 
the provision of heroin to the most severely addicted users, the testing of pills and powders, and the 
decriminalisation of cannabis.  These newer measures are more controversial and do not yet enjoy 
widespread implementation.  For example, the International Narcotics Control Board (1999) has 
deemed the provision of drug consumption rooms as being against the terms of the international 
conventions on drug control.  Others, however, argue that much of the world could do more to 
provide even the basic harm reduction measures.  MacGregor (2011), for example, suggests that 
more harm reduction work is urgently needed on a global scale in relation to the prevention of 
hepatitis and the reduction of drug-related harm for vulnerable groups such as those working in 
prostitution, migrant populations, and people in prison. 
 
 
Harm reduction has been hampered by a persistent perception that it condones and, in some cases, 
enables, the use of illegal drugs (Rehm et al, 2010), and has long been, wrongly, associated with the 
legalisation movement.   'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞƚŚƵƐĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚůǇǁŽƌƌŝĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚ ‘ƐĞŶĚƐŽƵƚƚŚĞǁƌŽŶŐ
ŵĞƐƐĂŐĞ ? ?ƵWŽŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?On the other side of the coin, Bourgois & Schonberg (2009) contest that 
harm reduction resonates well with middle class users but actually alienates street users as they are 
ŝŶĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŶŐŚĂƌŵƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŝƌĚĂŝůǇƌŽƵƚŝŶĞƐ ?,ĞŝŶǀŽŬĞƐ&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ?Ɛ
ŝĚĞĂƐĂďŽƵƚĂ ‘ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŽĞǆƉůĂŝŶŚŽǁĚƌƵŐƵƐĞƌƐĐĂŶďĞĐŽŵĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůŝƐĞĚďǇ
well meaning harm reduction practices as they publicly fail to discipline their abnormality . There are 
ĂůƐŽƉƌŽďůĞŵƐƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ŚĂƌŵ ?ǁŚŝĐ ĐĂŶŵĂŬĞŝƚĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇĞǀĂůƵĂƚĞ
initiatives (Hall, 2007).   Finally, criticisms have been made about the ideological limitations of harm 
reduction as being restricted to policies that reduce the harm of other, already existing, policies 
(Keane, 2003).  
 
Because of these long standing critiques, Hall (2007) suggests that we should move away from harm 
reduction terminology and, instead, attempt to implement an approach that is based on the 
principles of public health more broadly, allowing the introduction of strategies that are concerned 
with improving health from the outset, rather than as an anti-dote to a law enforcement oriented 
policy.  In this way, the values of public health can underlie drug policy in the provision of a four 
pillar system of drug control comprising prevention, treatment, enforcement and harm reduction.  
Stevens (2011a) further suggests that drug use disproportionately affects vulnerable people and is 
often rooted in inequality, and that this would continue to be the case even if drugs were 
decriminalised or legalised.  Even public health policies can ignore these wider inequalities and 
Strang et al (2012: 71) have therefore ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ ‘ƉƵďůŝĐŐŽŽĚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ŚĂƚ
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞĚƌƵŐƉŽůŝĐǇ “ƐŚŽƵůĚĂŝŵƚŽƉƌŽŵŽƚĞƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐŐŽŽĚďǇŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĂŶĚƉƵďůŝĐ
health, neighbourhood safety, and community and family cohesion, and by reducŝŶŐĐƌŝŵĞ ? ? 
 
Despite the growing academic appetite for basing drug policies on principles of harm reduction, 
public health and public good, Portugal remains one of the only countries in the world to have 
designed their national drug policy centring on these concepts.  Portuguese policy has been 
promoted as humanistic and pragmatic (Council of Ministers, 1999), and encompasses, not only the 
decriminalisation of the possession of all drugs for personal consumption, but also the provision of 
treatment for all who seek it, the extension of harm reduction programmes, the reintegration of 
dependent drug users into society, and, where possible, the abandonment of imprisonment as a 
punishment for drugs use (van het Loo et al., 2002; Chatwin, 2011).  Elsewhere, harm reduction and 
public health/good strategies have gained ground, but have ultimately been limited to  ‘ĂĚĚŽŶƐ ?ƚŽ
the primary law enforcement orientated policies, and have often been viewed as being in direct 
conflict with, and secondary to, the aims of significant reduction in the supply and demand of drugs. 
 
Alongside these developments, but receiving much less attention, has been the recognition of the 
importance of human rights in the development of drug policy.  Every UN member state has now 
ratified nine human rights treaties (Jensema, 2015) which promote and encourage respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction.  This means that everyone 
involved in the illicit drugs market is protected by human rights laws and any drug control measure 
 “ƚŚĂƚǀŝŽůĂƚĞƐƚŚĞŝƌďĂƐŝĐŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐŝƐŝůůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞ ? (Jensema, 2015: 1).  Numerous examples, 
however, can be found of drug control policies throughout the world that do violate human rights: 
military operations against farmers who produce drugs, the chemical spraying of swathes of crops in 
attempts to eradicate drugs, the use of the death penalty for those involved in the drugs trade, and 
racial discrimination within systems of drug control.   
 
Bartilow (2014) describes how counternarcotics policies often work towards actually increasing 
human rights abuses.  For example, aid coming from the US and Europe has been used to fund the 
EŝŐĞƌŝĂŶƌƵŐ>ĂǁŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚĂŐĞŶĐǇǁŚŝĐŚĞŶŐĂŐĞƐŝŶŝŶŚƵŵĂŶĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ “ƌŽƵƚŝŶĞ
shooting of cannabis farmers and the standard arrest of drug offenders deported after completing 
their prison sentences in other coƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? ?<ůĞŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?Amnesty International has drawn 
attention to the executions in 2011 of 488 people, including children, for drug trafficking offences in 
Iran (Amnesty International, 2011), ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂƐƐŝƐƚĞĚŝŶŝƚƐ ‘ǁĂƌŽŶĚƌƵŐƐ ?ďǇƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ
amounts of aid from the EU.  As Barratt (2010: 142 ?ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ?ƚŚĞĚƌƵŐĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ “ĐĂŶŶŽƚ
ĚŝƐƉůĂĐĞŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐůĂǁ ?ŽƌƉƵƚƚŚĞŵselves above it, and by tolerating or knowingly ignoring 
abuses, international systems of drug control become complicit in human rights violations (Mena & 
Hobbs, 2010). 
 
In order, then, to move forward in a more effective global drug policy, we need to replace the kind 
ŽĨƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚŝŶǀŽŬĞƐĂ ‘ǁĂƌŽŶĚƌƵŐƐ ? ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŬŝŶĚŽĨ prohibition which is linked to and 
tempered by the promotion of harm reduction, public health and public good.  A good starting place 
for incorporating these philosophies into drug policy is by seeking to reduce the harm done to drug 
users, predominantly by stringent enforcement strategies.  Drug policy, however, should ultimately 
aim to evolve from this position to one where the intrinsic values of public health and public good 
are used as the building blocks for drug policies.  It is not enough to include these strategies as an 
adjunct to law enforcement oriented policies  W they must be given equal footing, or even placed at 
the centre, as we have seen is the case in Portugal.  Furthermore, aims must not be limited to the 
promotion of harm reduction and public health/good goals: discussions must also be framed in 
terms of fundamental human rights (Bewley-Taylor, 2005).   
 
3. Encourage the development of innovative strategies of drug policy control 
 
As part of the effort to implement alternatives to prohibition, it is important to recognise that there 
ŝƐ “ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞƌŽŽŵĨŽƌŵĂŶŽĞƵǀƌĞ ? ?ĞǁůĞǇ-Taylor & Jelsma, 2011: 9) under the international 
treaties in the way that individual nations respond to many aspects of drug control, particularly 
around the field of drug use and drug users.  Given that, to date, no strategy of drug control that has 
been employed anywhere across the globe has been unilaterally successful in eradicating the drug 
problem, or even in significantly reducing the use and/or supply of drugs, in many ways it makes 
sense to allow a diversity of innovative drug policy strategies to bloom in the effort to find effective 
ways to reduce the harm caused by drug use and the policies employed to control them.   Rather 
than seeking to close down the available drug policy options, international drug policy regimes ought 
ƚŽďĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐǁŝƚŚŽƉĞŶŝŶŐ “ƵƉƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƉŽůŝĐǇĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶĂƚƚŚĞ
national levĞůŽƌ ? ? ?ĂƚƐƵďŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĞǀĞůƐ ? ?ZŽŽŵ ?DĂĐŬĂǇ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?dŚĞƐĞ ƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚƐǁĞƌĞĞĐŚŽĞĚ
at the recent Cartagena summit in Colombia in 2012, at which Latin American leaders called for 
 “ŽƉĞŶĂŶĚĨƌĂŶŬĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐŽĨĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƐƚŽh^ĚƌƵŐĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ ? (Bartilow, 2014: 42).  
 
dŚĞŵŽƐƚǁĞůůŬŶŽǁŶ ‘ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƚŽĂǁĂƌŽŶĚƌƵŐƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨĚƌƵŐƐŝƐ
the decriminalisation, depenalisation or regulation of certain drugs in certain situations.  These 
terms are often used interchangeably, but actually represent distinct points on a drug policy 
continuum from criminalisation to legalisation.  Depenalisation denotes a policy where a particular 
behaviour (e.g. use of cannabis) remains criminal but the punishment of imprisonment has been 
removed, decriminalisation denotes a policy where a behaviour is no longer criminalised but 
punishments (e.g. fines, warnings) can still be applied, and regulation denotes a policy where a 
behaviour is not criminalised and cannot be punished, but where certain restrictions apply (e.g. as is 
ƚŚĞĐĂƐĞĨŽƌƵƐĞŽĨĂůĐŽŚŽůĂŶĚƚŽďĂĐĐŽ ? ?dŚĞƐĞ ‘ĚĞĐƌŝŵŝŶĂů ƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽƉƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞŶŽƚŶĞǁƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞs  W 
Rosmalin & Eastwood (2012) describe how some countries never criminalised drug use and 
possession in the first place and others have had decriminalisation policies in place since the early 
1970s.   
 
In the past fifteen years, however, many more countries have moved towards the decriminalisation 
model, mainly in relation to cannabis, but sometimes in relation to the possession of all drugs for 
personal use.  Within Europe for example, Belgium and Luxembourg have effectively removed 
criminal sanctions for the possession of cannabis for personal use.  Germany, Estonia and Lithuania, 
meanwhile, have written the possibility of waiving prosecution in the case of small amounts for 
personal use of any drug into their penal codes.  Spain, the Czech Republic and Latvia have gone one 
step further making administrative sanctions the norm for possession of small amounts of illegal 
drugs for personal use (Chatwin, 2010b).  Elsewhere Armenia, Chile and Mexico have all adopted 
some form of decriminalisation policy as part of this new wave.  Perhaps the most well known recent 
example of decriminalisation comes from Portugal where the possession of all drugs for personal use 
was decriminalised in 2001 as part of the overhaul of national drug laws to align them with public 
health principles.   
 
An important point to note here is that different countries have interpreted decriminalisation in 
radically different ways.  Thus, in contrast to Portugal, the coffeeshop model which developed in the 
Netherlands in the 1970s, is only concerned with the decriminalisation of cannabis in an effort to 
 ‘ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞƚŚĞŵĂƌŬĞƚ ? (Boekhaut van Solinge, 1999) for this drug from other more harmful ones.  To 
this end, coffeeshops provide a semi legal environment in which the sale and purchase of cannabis is 
tolerated on a small scale, but, rather confusingly, no provision is made for the legal supply of 
coffeeshops themselves (Korf, 2008) leaving the wholesale end of the market firmly in criminal 
ŚĂŶĚƐ ?ŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĂŐĂŝŶĂƌĞƚŚĞŶĞǁĞƌƐǇƐƚĞŵƐŽĨ ‘ĐĂŶŶĂďŝƐĐůƵďƐ ? ?ŽƌŝŐŝŶĂƚŝŶŐŝŶ^ƉĂŝŶďƵƚƋƵŝĐŬůǇ
being adopted elsewhere, (Decorte, 2014) which take advantage of national legislative loopholes 
tolerating the growth of one or two cannabis plants for personal consumption, to allow the 
collective production of much larger amounts of cannabis. 
 
In the last couple of years, some countries have taken even more innovative steps in relation to their 
cannabis policies, surpassing the decriminalisation of this drug by implementing fully regulated 
markets.  Although the American systems share the general aim of creating a regulated cannabis 
market, there are important differences in how they have implemented this legislation (see Room, 
2014 for a discussion of these), lending an exploratory nature to the venture of finding a workable 
alternative to criminalisation.  Different again is the more paternalistic and less commercialised 
(Room, 2014) situation in Uruguay.   
 
While there is little indication that this kind of policy will be extended to drugs other than cannabis, 
a range of potential options for creating regulated markets for all prohibited drugs have been 
developed (Rolles, 2009).  Indeed, many of these options are already being partially incorporated in 
various parts of the world.  For example, one option for developing a regulated market for very 
harmful drugs such as heroin, would be to provide access to them via prescription.  This could be 
either for them to take home to consume later (as practised in Britain from the 1920s-1960s) or to 
consume on specially provided premises (as trialled recently in Switzerland and the Netherlands.  
Another option, perhaps suitable for some stimulant drugs, would be to adapt pharmacies to be able 
to sell these substances under strict regimes controlling amount and providing medical advice.  The 
regulated cannabis market in Uruguay will partially operate under such a system.  Finally, those 
drugs perceived to be considered less harmful could be sold either by those holding licenses granted 
by the government (as is the case with alcohol and tobacco) or in licenses premises (as with 
coffeeshops in the Netherlands or drug consumption rooms around the world).    
 
The main point to emphasise from this discussion is that this diversity of strategy in dealing with 
either the decriminalisation of drugs in general, or the regulation of cannabis in particular, should be 
seen as a strength.  In relation to the different developments in cannabis policy, Uchtenhagen (2014: 
 ? ? ? ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚĂ “ƉŽůŝĐǇĂůůŽǁŝŶŐĨŽƌĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞĐƌĞĚŝďůĞĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
evaluation of effects not only improves the chances for evidence-based decisions, but also the 
ĐŚĂŶĐĞƐĨŽƌƉƵďůŝĐĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĐĞ ? ? In other words, it is only through experimentation with innovative 
policy options that we will discover effective and appropriate drug policy solutions.  International 
systems of drug control should therefore seek to open up the existing drug policy options and 
 “ƐŽŵĞŚŽǁƐŚŽǁŵŽƌĞĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĂůůŽǁƚŚŝƐŝƌƌĞǀĞƌƐŝďůĞĚǇŶĂŵŝĐŽĨƌĞĨŽƌŵƚŽŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ?
ĂĚĂƉƚĂŶĚŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƐĞƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ?sĂƐĐŽŶŝ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? 
 
 
4. Ensure that drug policy innovations are evaluated and evidence on their effectiveness is 
shared widely  
 
As Uchtergang (2014) argues above, drug policy innovations are only useful in a system that also 
allows for evaluation of novel strategies and which has the resources to disseminate the results 
widely. Traditionally, the gap between evidence and policy has been particularly striking in the field 
of drug policy, with war on drugs policies continuing to operate in stark contrast to the significant 
evidence that has been gathered about their ineffectiveness (Wood et al, 2010). Recent years have 
seen ŵƵĐŚĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨ ‘ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ-ďĂƐĞĚƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ŝŶďƵŝůĚŝŶŐĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞĚƌƵŐĐŽŶƚƌŽů
strategies (Boaz & Pawson, 2005), alongside a counter debate about the low value that is usually 
placed on evidence in drug policy making (Stevens, 2011b).  Most research in this area now suggests 
ƚŚĂƚ “ŐŽŽĚƉŽůŝĐǇŝƐƉƌĞƐƵŵĞĚƚŽďĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶĂƐŽůŝĚĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞďĂƐĞ ? (Ritter, 2007: 70), with the 
caveat that evidence must also compete with political and public opinion in the actual 
implementation of policy. More specifically, Wood et al (2010: 311- ? ? ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚ “ƌĞŽƌŝĞŶƚŝŶŐ
drug policies towards evidence-based approaches that respect, protect, and fulfil human rights has 
the potential to reduce harms deriving from current policies and would allow for the redirection of 
the vast financial resources to where they are needed most: the implementation and evaluation of 
evidence-based prevention, regulatory, treatment, and harm-ƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? 
 
In global terms, both the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the European 
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) have concerned themselves with the 
collation and dissemination of statistical information on the nature of the illicit drug situation in 
different countries and global regions, in an effort to improve the evidence base on which drug 
policy is founded.  Typically, data is collected by individual countries in areas such as the number of 
drug users and the frequency of use, drug related deaths and disease, and the number of police 
arrests and drug seizures. This data is then collated and disseminated widely.  This is important 
work, but there is much that could be done to improve it were evidence gathering to be prioritised 
and resources to be made available.   
 
Cross-national comparative research conducted on this scale is often hampered by different 
research methods and cultures (Galtung, 1990; Hakim, 2000).  Additional problems include scarce 
data of poor quality from many countries, as well as the inherent problems faced when attempting 
to uniformly define complex concepts such as drug-related death, disease, or crime (MacCoun & 
Reuter, 2001).  Another problem arises because there are no universally accepted indicators of 
success by which to judge individual drug strategies (Flynn, 2001).  This point can be illuminated by 
considering the respective evaluations of Swedish and Dutch drug policies.  In Sweden, for example, 
the generally low levels of prevalence of drug use (EMCDDA, 2015) have been attributed to the 
uniformity and totality of their zero-tolerance approach to illicit drugs, which have been deemed to 
ďĞĂƐƚƌŽŶŐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƉŽůŝĐǇŝŶŐůŽďĂůƚĞƌŵƐ ?hEK ? ? ? ? ? ? ?/ŶƚŚĞ
Netherlands meanwhile, where levels of prevalence are generally higher, the decreasing number of 
dependent drug users and the health and longevity of those who are dependent on drugs (EMCDDA, 
 ? ? ? ? ? ?ŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƐŝŵŝůĂƌůǇĚƌĂǁŶƵƉŽŶƚŽŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƚŚĞ ‘ƐƵĐĐĞ Ɛ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƵƚĐŚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?'ƌƵŶĚ ?
Breeksema, 2013).  Furthermore, while the evaluation of drug demand reduction initiatives is now 
well established, there has been very little attempt to evaluate the impact of supply reduction 
initiatives.  Traditionally, initiatives directed towards disrupting the supply of drugs have been 
presumed to be necessary and effective in controlling hte drug market, but, there is no shared 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨǁŚĂƚĚĞĨŝŶĞƐ ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐĨŝĞůĚ ?^ƚĞǀĞŶƐ ? ? ? ? ?c) and no concrete evidence that 
a net benefit is being achived from these policies.  A recent external evaluation of European drug 
ƉŽůŝĐǇĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐĂ “ůĂĐŬŽĨƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ ? ?ZĂŶĚ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?ŝŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĞŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌƐ ? 
 
If we want to be able to use this kind of data to make informed decisions about what kinds of drug 
policy intervention are likely to be successful in specific circumstances, we need to invest more time 
and resources in producing common definitions of drug related problems, common indicators by 
which to judge the success of initiatives, and common methods and practices for data collection.  
We could also do more to improve the ways that we share and disseminate this information on a 
global scale. Rather than ĂŝŵŝŶŐƚŽ ‘ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞďĞƐƚŽǀĞƌĂůůŵĞƚŚŽĚŽĨĚƌƵŐĐŽŶƚƌŽůĂŶĚƚŚĞŶ
forcing its worldwide implementation, we could accept that there is often little relationship between 
style of drug policy and nature of the drug problem (Reinerman et al, 2004).  Instead, dissemination 
efforts could focus on encouraging policy emulation by making existing robust policies available to 
new locations experiencing similar problems, by making incidences of best practice and national 
drug strategy evaluations widely available, and by bringing networks of experts together, for 
example from consumer and producer countries, to discuss issues of common interest.   
 
Standring (2012) provides evidence to suggest that Europe, via the EMCDDA, is starting to take this 
kind of data dissemination seriously, but it is not yet a global practice and is in danger of becoming 
under-funded.  The value of the innovative drug strategies outlined above depends on this kind of 
research commitment.  Innovations must not be produced in isolation but must be implemented 
within a framework that allows for their thorough evaluation and which brings networks of experts 
together to discuss their efficacy.  Under such a regime, we can begin to build up a picture of which 
strategies are appropriate in which different locations and situations.  So, just as the rejection of 
 ‘ǁĂƌŽŶĚƌƵŐƐ ? requires an alternative aim of drug policy to fill the vacuum (commitment to harm 
reduction, public health and human rights), so must the encouragement of a variety of innovative 
drug strategies be underpinned by the provision of a framework that improves both evidence 
building and the way in which we share information.  
 
5. Broaden the horizons of the drug policy debate 
The final piece in the puzzle to determine what we should do about drugs, is recognising the need to 
broaden our horizons in terms of what is considered a relevant part of the drug policy debate today.  
Much of this chapter has described the tensions between the drug problems as perceived by 
predominantly Western consumer countries, and predominantly producer countries from the rest of 
the world.  The war on drugs approach has long encouraged the US, and by extension the UK and 
much of Europe, to conceptualise illicit drugs as a problem that is coming from the outside, and 
which is perpetuated by poor control strategies in those countries from which drugs often originate 
such as West Africa and Latin America.  This chapter has described a growing involvement in global 
drug policy debates from, in particular, Latin American heads of state who often put forward the 
viewpoint that many drug related problems present in producer countries are caused, at least in 
part, by overwhelming demand from consumer countries in the West.  There is a growing sense 
within the field of criminology in general that much of the academic body of knowledge in this field 
comes from a Western centric viewpoint (Aas, 2007), and this debate has been readily extended to 
the illegal drugs field (Youngers & Roisin, 2005).  In order to produce a more effective global drug 
policy, this problem must be overcome and effective strategies must be implemented within a global 
framework that considers the problems of both producer and consumer countries, and which 
designs strategies that can bridge them both. 
 
It is not, however, only a greater variety of geographical locations which need to be given an equal 
footing in drug policy debates.  It is arguably no longer appropriate to base discussions around the 
usual substances (e.g. cannabis, MDMA, cocaine, heroin, crack cocaine, amphetamines).  For a long 
time there have been calls to consider legal substances, namely alcohol and tobacco, alongside 
illegal substances (Gable, 2004; NICE, 2010).  WƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌĂǀŝĚEƵƚƚ ?ĨŽƌŵĞƌůǇŚĞĂĚŽĨƚŚĞh< ?Ɛ
Advisory Committee on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD), has done much work on this issue.  Together 
with a range of scientific colleagues and experts, Nutt has produced evidence in support of these 
calls by developing a scale of harm that considers the physical harms (damage to organs and bodily 
systems, toxicity, route of administration, immediate and chronic health problems), the dependence 
harms (addictive qualities including psychological dependence, withdrawal symptoms) and the social 
harms (harm to families and societies, costs to systems of health care, social care and police) of 
different substances in an effort to produce a universal classification of substances by harm (Nutt et 
al, 2007; 2010).   
 
Alongside illegal substances, both alcohol and tobacco are also considered, and the latest research 
(Nutt et al, 2010) has alcohol at the top of the list as the most harmful substance, while tobacco is 
placed sixth out of twenty.  Cannabis appears around the middle of the scale of harmful substances 
while LSD, ecstasy and magic mushrooms, usually classified as very harmful drugs, are at the bottom.  
These findings lend support to the idea that alcohol and, to a lesser extent, tobacco, ought to be 
targeted at least as hard as illegal substances under harm reduction/public health oriented 
strategies, and that the various systems of drug harm classification ought to be updated and based 
on scientific evidence.  It is perhaps unsurprising that Professor Nutt was summarily sacked as head 
of the ACMD by the Tory part for producing this evidence and expounding his view that the use of 
ecstasy is less harmful, to both individuals and society, than popular sporting activities such as horse 
riding (Nutt, 2009). 
 
The last decade has revealed, therefore, that we need to broaden our horizons by recognising the 
relative harm of alcohol and tobacco in comparison to illegal substances.  The latest phenomenon to 
catch the attention of drug policy makers and practitioners around the globe has been the rise in the 
popularity, availability and use of New Psychoactive Substances (NPS) - a catch all term for chemical 
compounds that have been modified and developed to mimic the effects of drugs that are already 
prohibited.  Latest figures from the EMCDDA indicate that more than 280 potentially harmful NPS 
and more than 690 online sites and headshops are now being monitored in Europe (EMCDDA & 
ƵƌŽƉŽů ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ůĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƚŽĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚEW^ “ĂƌĞĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐĂƚĂŶ
ƵŶƉƌĞĐĞĚĞŶƚĞĚƌĂƚĞ ? ?ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?KŶĂŐůŽďĂůƐĐĂůĞ ?ƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽnal Narcotics 
ŽŶƚƌŽůŽĂƌĚ ?/E ?ŚĂƐĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŝƐĐĂƵƐŝŶŐ “ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ ? ?/E ? ? ? ? ?: 97) 
and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is in the process of developing an early 
warning advisory (EWA) to share information on NPS on a global scale (UNODC, 2013).   
 
Also relevant to ongoing debates are other kinds of substances often broadly described as Human 
Enhancement Drugs (HEDs), although these substances have received much less popular and 
academic attention.  Evans-Brown et al (2012) describe how these are divided into six categories: 
muscle drugs such as steroids, weight loss drugs, image enhancing drugs (e.g. Melanotan), sexual 
enhancers, cognitive enhancers (e.g. Ritalin), and mood and behaviour enhancers (e.g. Diazepam).  
The increasing range and scope of development of these substances has huge implications for the 
kind of policies that can be implemented, and also adds to the evidence that prohibition based 
policies can have significant unintended consequences.  For example, the ease of developing NPS, 
has meant that national governments have had to think of new strategies to supplement traditional 
systems of legislation that list prohibited substances one by one via a lengthy and bureaucratic 
process.    Going forward from this point, it seems sensible to include a much greater range of 
substances than the traditional illegal drugs, even with alcohol and tobacco added in, when 
implementing holistic substance use policies. 
 
Finally, in another example of the limited ability of prohibition policies to effectively control drugs, 
drug markets have radically changed, with the advent of internet markets for not yet criminalised 
NPS and HED.  While the development of these kind of novel substances is not a new problem per se 
it is generally accepted that the internet has played a significant role in their marketing and 
ĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ?^ĞĚĚŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂƐůĞĚƚŽĂŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞŝŶƚŚĞŝƌ “ƌĂŶŐĞ ?ƉŽƚĞŶĐǇ ?ƉƌŽĨŝůĞĂŶĚ
ĂǀĂŝůĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?tŝŶƐƚŽĐŬ ?ZĂŵƐĞǇ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ? ?KǀĞƌĂŶĚĂbove this significant development, has 
been the rise of the darknet, accessible through Tor anonymising software which encrypts computer 
IP addresses, as an illegal drug market place (Barrat, 2012; van Hout & Bingham, 2013a).  Van Hout & 
Bingham (2013b: 389) have described accessing darknet drug markets places (e.g. Silk Road, Agora) 
ĂƐ “ĂũŽǇĨƵů ‘ĐŚŝůĚŝŶĂƐǁĞĞƚƐŚŽƉ ?ƚǇƉĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞďǇǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨŝƚƐŚŽƐƚŽĨƋƵĂůŝƚǇƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐĂŶĚ
vendors, and its capacity to offer an anonymous, safe, and speedy transactioning without any of the 
ƌŝƐŬƐĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƐƚƌĞĞƚĚƌƵŐƐŽƵƌĐŝŶŐ ? ?dĂŬĞŶƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƐĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶƚǇƉĞƐŽĨ
substance available and types of markets operationalised have meant that there is much to do in 
terms of adding to the body of knowledge in these areas, as well as considering intersections 
between the old and new, exploring how these developments change our understandings of 
traditional drug markets, and inspiring appropriate lines of policy improvement. 
 
Conclusion 
The discussion provided above therefore provides a clear outline of the steps that must be taken by 
global drug policy if it is to become a more effective and more humane process.  The first step must 
be to publicly and comprehensively acknowledge the failure of Ă ‘ǁĂƌŽŶĚƌƵŐƐ ? approach to drug 
policy, and the many unintended consequences that have been caused by this approach.  Once this 
has been acknowledged, we can move forward in implementing new aims in global drug policy to sit 
alongside, or in place of, stringent law enforcement strategies: the reduction of the harm caused by 
either drug use itself, or the policies employed to control drug use; the implementation of strategies 
that promote public heath or public good; and the importance of operating within the terms of 
human rights legislation.  At the same time, we should be opening up drug policy possibilities and 
seeking to employ experimental or innovative strategies of drug control in an effort to become more 
efficient and effective in our pursuit of these aims.  These drug policy innovations must be 
underpinned by robust frameworks for evaluation and the networks must be in place to ensure that 
the results can be easily and widely shared.  In this way, countries, regions or localities, will all be 
able to peruse the range of strategies being employed across the globe and pick those most likely to 
provide successful outcomes for their particular situation.  Finally, all this must be done while 
keeping in mind the need to focus the debate on both producer and consumer countries, on alcohol 
and tobacco as well as illegal substances, on the new range of semi-legal substances such as New 
Psychoactive Substances and Human Enhancement Drugs, and on emerging markets such as those 
provided by the clearweb and the darkweb. 
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